Page 279 - James Rodger Fleming - Fixing the sky
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funding,  a  single  agency  with  deep  pockets—for  example,  the  Department
                   of Energy, NASA, or even the Department of Defense or Homeland Security—
                   is not the way to go. Neither is a private company in which commercial goals
                   may overwhelm scientific objectivity. This field needs enhanced public input
                   and open peer review, such as that provided by the National Science Foundation.
                     Recently, atmospheric scientist William Cotton pointed out the relationship
                   between weather engineering and climate engineering, along with their system-
                   atic problems and structural differences. In weather modification experiments,
                   the scientific community requires “proof ” that cloud seeding has increased pre-
                   cipitation. Following an intervention, such proof would include “strong physical
                   evidence of appropriate modifications to cloud structures and highly significant
                   statistical evidence”—that is, effects that exceed the natural background vari-
                   ability of the atmosphere. But intervention is not control. In 1946 Kathleen
                   Blodgett at General Electric told Irving Langmuir that intervening in or modi-
                   fying a cloud was a far cry from controlling its subsequent motion and growth
                   or the characteristics of its precipitation. Having experienced the promise and
                   hype of cloud seeding, and after having worked for fifty years in this field, Cot-
                   ton admitted, “We cannot point to strong physical and statistical evidence that
                   these early claims have been realized.” 100  He went on to note that proof of suc-
                   cess in climate engineering would be far harder to establish than in weather engi-
                   neering. In fact, it would be impossible, for several reasons: climate models are
                   not designed to be predictive, so there is no forecast skill; global climate experi-
                   ments cannot be randomized or repeated and cannot be done without likely
                   collateral damage; climate variability is very high, so the background-noise-to-
                   signal ratio is overwhelming; and climate change is slow to develop because of
                   built-in thermal lags due to oceans and ice sheets. What all this adds up to is that
                   experimental “results” could not be established even within the experimenters’
                   life spans. Did I mention the chaotic behavior of the climate system? That alone
                   would  overwhelm  any  attribution  of  experimental  interventions  by  climate
                   engineers. Cotton warned that in times of drought or climate stress, politicians
                   would emerge with the need to demonstrate that they were doing something,
                   that they were in control of the situation, even if they only enacted what he
                   called political placebos.




                   the middle Course

                   In 1983 Thomas Schelling outlined four basic policy choices for responding to
                   carbon dioxide–induced climate change:


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