Page 257 - James Rodger Fleming - Fixing the sky
P. 257

the dramatic warming of the Arctic, identified and measured by 1940, which, had
                   it continued, could have resulted in “a new and stable climatic regime” in which
                   the Arctic ocean became ice-free.
                     From climate “triggers,” Fletcher moved on to a discussion of the possibilities of
                   deliberately influencing climate. Here he followed the theoretical lead of Russian
                   scientist M. I. Yudin, who sought to identify critical “instability points” for inter-
                   vening in the development of cyclones, by changing either their winds or steer-
                   ing currents or their heat budget.  Using back-of-the-envelope calculations that
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                   have become de rigueur among geoengineers, Fletcher estimated that it would
                   take only sixty C-5 aircraft to conduct cloud-seeding operations over the entire
                   Arctic Basin and to exert “enormous thermal leverage” by creating or dissipating
                   clouds, influencing the reflectivity of the Arctic pack ice with soot or carbon black,
                   or even changing the course of ocean currents with macro-engineering projects.
                     Fletcher  again  presented  his  four-stage  model  of  what  he  called  “progress
                   toward climate control”: “We must observe how nature behaves before we can
                   understand why, we must understand before we can predict, and we must be able
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                   to predict the outcome before we undertake measures for control.”  He warned,
                   however, that while modern technology was already capable of influencing the
                   global climate system or “heat engine” by altering patterns of thermal forcing,
                   the consequences of such acts could not be adequately predicted. The situation
                   was pretty much the same then as it is now. Geoengineers tend to argue linearly,
                   in a mythical orderly series from science, to engineering, to a public discussion
                   with other “citizens,” who can then be educated on the wonders of science and
                   the  possibilities  of  engineering.  Prefiguring  later  optimism,  Fletcher  thought
                   that an improved observational system, combining ground stations and satellite
                   surveillance, paleoclimatic reconstructions, much faster computers, and better
                   models, would resolve the problems and allow simulations to be performed in
                   enough detail “to evaluate the consequences of specific climate modification acts.”
                   He estimated that this capability would be available by 1973, but close to four
                   decades later it is still a desideratum (for some).
                     Having  spent  most  of  his  time  on  technical  speculations,  Fletcher  turned
                   briefly  to  what  he  called  “international  cooperation”  for  the  management  of
                   global climatic resources, basing his comments on his assumption that purpose-
                   ful  climate  modification  deserved  the  attention  of  scientific  and  government
                   leaders.  Repeating  the  opening  lines  of  Wexler’s  lecture  (could  Fletcher  have
                   been in the audience in 1962?), he invoked John F. Kennedy’s statement to the
                   United Nations regarding “further co-operative efforts between all nations in
                   weather prediction and eventually in weather control” (21). Fletcher also cited
                   a joint congressional resolution of April 1, 1968, to the effect that the United


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