Page 227 - James Rodger Fleming - Fixing the sky
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that they should try to destroy or disrupt what had just been discovered. They
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                   did this with the full cooperation of astronomer James Van Allen.  A specially
                   equipped naval convoy launched and detonated three 1.7-kiloton atomic bombs
                   at altitudes ranging from 125 to 335 miles above the South Atlantic ocean to “seed”
                   the exosphere with electrons. The participants hyped it as the “greatest scientific
                   experiment of all time” and claimed it was a test of a geophysical theory proposed
                   by Nicholas C. Christophilos of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.  In scale it was
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                   indeed impressive, involving nine ships and 4,500 people, with “nuclear observa-
                   tions” taken by the overflying satellite Explorer 4, a barrage of high-altitude five-
                   stage Jason sounding rockets, airplane flights, and ground stations—but there was
                   very little science, apparently. Test results and other documentation remained
                   classified for the next twenty-five years. The military purpose was most likely to
                   see if and how nuclear explosions disrupted communication channels. Since an
                   atmospheric test-ban treaty was then under negotiation, the military was quick to
                   point out that this test was not in the atmosphere but “above it.”
                     other nuclear tests in near space ensued, such as the much larger Starfish
                   explosion of July 1962 above Johnston Island, which disrupted the Van Allen
                   belts and created an artificial magnetic belt and an “aurora tropicalis” visible as
                   far away as New Zealand, Jamaica, and Brazil. Three Soviet high-altitude explo-
                   sions that year had similar effects. A New Yorker cartoon depicted a serious-look-
                   ing technocrat questioning a colleague in a high-tech laboratory setting: “But
                   how do you know destroying the inner Van Allen belt will create havoc until you
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                   try it?”  It was quite a year for near-space fireworks, with the British, Danes, and
                   Australians issuing formal protests, led by the astronomical community. During
                   the tests, some hotels in the Pacific apparently offered “rainbow” bomb parties
                   on their roofs so guests could watch the light shows.
                     one of the more bizarre items that crossed Harry Wexler’s desk at the U.S.
                   Weather Bureau in 1961 was a technical report simply called “Weather Modifi-
                   cation,” by M. B. Rodin and D. C. Hess at Argonne National Laboratory. The
                   authors  made  the  reasonable  suggestion  that  applying  heat  directly  to  a  rain
                   cloud, or to a moist air mass with rain potential, might alter the natural precip-
                   itation in a given geographical region by increasing the buoyancy of the cloud
                   or air parcel. This was James Espy’s century-old convective theory. The modern
                   twist: they favored using large, hovering nuclear reactors “wherever safety crite-
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                   ria can be met” to deliver the huge amounts of heat required (figure 7.4).  Such
                   nuclear-powered aircraft were never built.
                     Not all space seeding was nuclear. In 1960 the Department of Defense and
                   MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory announced a plan to launch 500 million tiny copper
                   wires into an 1,800-mile orbital ring to serve as radio antennae. Since the Earth’s


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